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NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE

In the instant case, the Court was faced with an alleged tort
of omission. In Feathers v. MlcLucas,3' which dealt with a tort
of commission, the Court of Appeals held that a tortious act is
committed only in the state where the defendant performed the
act. The Court in Platt indicated that the failure of a person to
do anything in one state cannot be an act done or committed in
another state. "To treat an 'omission' as an 'act' in a particular
place, one must be there to do or to omit the act. '32 Therefore,
although the consequences of the omission caused injury in New
York, the Court
believed that no tortious act had been committed
3
in this state8
CPLR 308(4): Court-devised methods of service.
CPLR 308(4) gives a court, upon the filing of an ex parte
motion, discretion to authorize special methods of service when
service under CPLR 308(1), (2), and (3) is impracticable. In
devising such methods, the court is required to afford the defendant
the constitutional protection of due process. As a minimum, due
process requires that substituted service must be reasonably calculated to give the defendant notice of the pending suit and an
opportunity to be heard.3 4
In a recent case arising out of an automobile accident, the
supreme court denied a motion under CPLR 308(4) requesting
the court to direct that substituted service be made upon defendant's insurance carrier. 35 At the time of the accident, defendant
resided in New York. The plaintiffs had attempted service at the
address given to the policeman at the scene of the accident, only
to find that defendant, since the time of the accident, had moved without leaving a forwarding address. The only other factors appearing
in the moving papers were that mail sent by the plaintiffs was
returned and that no current address could be found by inquiring
at the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, or by searching the telephone
directories of defendant's locale.
The court indicated that plaintiffs could have examined the
records of the insurer to ascertain whether it had defendant's
3-115 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E2d 68, 261 N.Y.S2d 8 (1965).
32 Platt Corp. v. Platt, 17 N.Y2d 234, 237, 217 N.E.2d 134, 135, 270
N.Y.S.2d 408, 410 (1966).
:3

In 1966, CPLR 302(a) was amended to include a new subsection (3).

This subsection provides that New York will have in personam jurisdiction
over a non-domiciliary who commits a tortious act without the state which
causes injury within the state under certain conditions (subparagraphs (i)
and (ii)). It does not appear, however, that this amendment will affect
the present case, since neither of the two conditions was met.
34 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, rehearing denied, 312 U.S. 712 (1940).
35
Winterstein v. Pollard, 50 Misc. 2d 354, 270 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct
Nassau County 1966).
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current address.36 Also, "plaintiffs by attachment plus publication
could have brought defendant within the in personam jurisdiction
of the New York courts . . . and attachment of the insurer's
obligation under the policy would be sufficient to that end. .... ,, 37

The court concluded that since the plaintiffs had not sufficiently
shown that service under CPLR 308(1) and (3) was impracticable,
their motion must be denied.
The court also predicated its holding upon the fact that service
upon the insurance carrier would not be sufficient to meet the
standards of due process. Absent some showing of an actual
relationship between the defendant and insurer, "it cannot be said
that notice to the insurer is reasonably calculated to give notice
to the defendant."38
In reaching its decision, the court was careful to distinguish
the instant case from two recent appellate division decisions based
on similar facts. In Dobkin v. Chapman," an order was granted
under CPLR 308(4) allowing ordinary mail to be the method of
service since (unlike the instant case) mail previously sent to
defendant's address had not been returned. Greenwood v. White4
was distinguished since the defendant there had given the police
officers a wrong address, whereas defendant in the instant case
gave the right address and lived there for two months after the
accident.
Although it might seem that the instant case limits the effect
of CPLR 308(4) as an instrument for substituted service, it
should be noted that each case under this section is factually
unique. Consequently, the relationship between due process and
the devised method of service is only meaningful in the context of
the unique circumstances of the individual case.
The court in the instant case indicated a practical solution to
many of the problems concerning substituted service upon New
York residents. The legislature could either designate the insurer
the agent of the insured for service, or authorize the bringing
of the action directly against the insurer.
CPLR 325(d): Amendment.
CPLR 325(d) has been amended to omit "of the county of
Bronx, Kings, Nassau, New York, Queens, Richmond or Westchester" following "of the surrogate's court."
The amendment merely makes the procedure outlined in CPLR
325(d) applicable in all counties. In a sense, CPLR 325(d),
36 CPLR
37

3102(c) allows such an examination.
Winterstein v. Pollard, mipra note 35, at 354-55, 270 N.Y.S.2d at 527.
38 Ibid.
39 25 App. Div. 2d 745, 269 N.Y.S.2d 49 (2d Dep't 1966).
40 25 App. Div. 2d 73, 266 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (3d Dep't 1966).

